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ABSTRACT 
 
The most recent efforts in institutional theory applied to organization studies search for ways to overcome 
consequences of traditional dichotomies based on levels of analysis, social structures versus agency as source of 
practices, and so on. If in other social sciences that debate has received fundamental contributions in the last 
three or four decades, this is not the case for Organization Theory, where discussions are much more recent and 
based especially on Sociology authors. The main purpose of this theoretical essay is to describe some 
neofunctionalist concepts – system openness and closeness, double contingency and expectation of expectations 
– proposed by Niklas Luhmann, discussing their impact on those dichotomies, in the realm of the Luhmannian 
theory of institutions. This effort is expected to contribute alternatives to that theoretical discussion that mark 
institutional organization theory for at least the past two decades.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The relationship between organizations and institutions lies at the heart of organizational studies. 
This indicates an important basic conflict as a framework of discussions surrounding the phenomenon 
of organizations, i.e. the discussion concerning the bases of social action, with rationalist and 
contingency explanations as the predominant alternatives. In this sense, the Theory of Organizations 
appears to be characterized, from the first, by the counter position to rationalism of the economic 
theories concerning human behavior, as seen in the studies of Simon (1970) and Selznick (1957, 
1966). In addition, the institutional theory in organizations has always been a promising alternative. 
According to Scott (2001) even the institutionalist perspective in the Economy arose as opposition to 
thinking based on the presupposition of rational and individualized economic behavior. Meanwhile, in 
Sociology, two classic perspectives in the treatment of the institutional phenomenon have marked the 
evolution of discussions into that theme and, even today, organizational theory. These perspectives 
are: the functionalist notion of environmental determination, from which institutions were defined as 
social facts by which autonomy and free will were seriously affected; and the interpretativist notion 
which, while not denying the importance of social conditioners, it reserved space for autonomy in the 
process of meaning, a necessary element for all action. The later development of the institutional 
analysis has become guided by some opposition and dichotomies and these were, as a result, also 
brought into the scope of organizational analysis. 
More recently, the efforts in institutional theory in organizations has been towards seeking to 
overcome traditional dichotomies in social and organizational theories, dichotomies concerning 
analysis levels or the relationship between structures and action as sources of social practices. In the 
scope of social theory, for some time analysis perspectives of social reality have been built which 
point out pathways to overcome these dichotomies. In the organization theory, these much more recent 
attempts have been made mostly by the appropriation of concepts and theories from other areas, 
mainly Sociology. 
In this article, we propose to describe these concepts of theory of autopoietic social systems in the 
framework developed by Niklas Luhmann and, based on these concepts, analyze the alternative 
possibilities for institutional theories in organizations, in which a reference is made to some of the 
theoretical debates which have taken place concerning that perspective for at least two decades. For 
Luhmann, the question of institutionalization is shown to be central to the explanation of processes of 
conforming to social and organizational reality. But unlike other authors who also admit this 
centrality, Luhmann remains little explored in organizational theory. The intention here is to 
contribute towards filling this gap and, furthermore, point out the potential of the neofunctionalist 
perspective in the analysis of organizational and administrative issues, a perspective that may acquire 
greater relevance as the contemporary ‘society of organizations’ becomes increasingly more complex. 
 
 
LACK OF DEFINITIONS AND CONFLICTS IN INSTITUTIONALIST ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
 
 
A purely rationalist approach of action is based mainly on the presupposition that all action follows a 
logic of maximization of self interest (Boudon, 1998). This notion, as pointed out by Granovetter 
(1985, p. 483), is central to Classical and Neoclassical Economics, its basis lying in “[...] an atomized, 
undersocialized conception of human action”. This mode of action is understood as a product of 
subjects in search of maximization of their own interest, “[...] affected minimally by social relations” 
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 481). The most radical form of this perspective admits that the environmental 
context that surrounds social actors (individuals or organizations) is a product of the competition 
between those actors and so the circumstances of social atomization are understood as a logical 
premise for perfect competition. João Marcelo Crubellate 
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In parallel with this version, there developed in Sociology “[...] a conception of people as 
overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of others and hence obedient to the dictates of consensually 
developed systems of norms and values, internalized through socialization [...]” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 
483). This normativist conception of social action, formulated by Parsons (1951), was so important for 
social and organizational theory that it received varied and differing criticisms. Its influence is evident 
from the earliest stages of the theory of organizations and until today, even though the same 
extremism is not repeated of the normativist conception of action. In the theory of organizations, the 
question seems to have remained in terms of the tendency to emphasize aspects that are external to the 
organizations – within them the institutions – as independent variables in relation to the social 
systems, mainly with the rise of the notion of open systems as an analytical paradigm. 
In this perspective, the seventies will be constituted as groundbreaking in organizational theory by 
the impulse of the movement which became known as ‘new institutionalism’ with its cognitivist 
emphasis of explanation of the fundamentals of social action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977). Despite this new emphasis, the new institutionalism remains in the 
contingency tradition of locating in the environment the conditioning elements of action. As stated by 
DiMaggio and Powell: 
The new institutionalism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor 
models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural 
explanations, and an interest in properties of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced 
to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991, p. 8, emphasis added). 
Here there are at least three important debates that have become the guides for institutional theory in 
organizations in recent years. 
The first of these debates follows sociological traditions by positioning itself against the paradigm of 
rational choice. What is predominant in the institutional theory in organizations is the understanding 
that the capacity for rational decision making of systems is affected by the contingencies of their 
context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Machado-da-Silva & Fonseca, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). To 
Machado-da-Silva and Fonseca (1999, p. 31), “according to the institutionalists, organizations are 
inserted in an environment that is constituted by rules, beliefs and values, created and consolidated 
through social interaction. In this sense, their survival depends on the capacity to follow collectively 
shared guidelines [...]”. This is one of the central understanding in the institutional perspective, 
generally accepted explicitly or implicitly under the concept of institutional environment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Machado-da-Silva & Fonseca, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1994; 
Tolbert, 1985). In this perspective of understanding, however, the institutional environment is defined 
as determining organizational behavior or, at least, as an independent variable in relation to it.  
In an even more radical way, Zucker (1991, p. 83) focuses only on the structuring aspect of 
environments when she admits that “[...] social knowledge once institutionalized exists as a fact, as 
part of objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis” (Zucker, 1991, p. 83). This 
conception, whose fundaments are recognizably linked to Durkheimian sociology, tends to equate an 
elevated degree of institutionalization with direct reproduction of the social pattern, resistance to its 
change (Zucker, 1991) and the constitution of habits of behavior (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). According 
to DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 11), “institutionalized arrangements are reproduced because 
individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives (or because they regard as 
unrealistic the alternatives they can imagine)”. Understood thus, the institutional environment has an 
elevated strength for diffusing social patterns of knowledge similar to the power of diffusion of 
normative patterns in the conception of Parsons (1951). Apparently, some studies (Zucker, 1991; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) substituted normative supersocialization for a sort of ‘cognitive 
supersocialization’, following the guidelines that institutionalized patterns determine action by 
determining the form of perceiving and interpreting reality. Thus, organizational actions are 
understood as necessarily connected in a high degree to institutionalized patterns (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996). Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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To Lourau (1995) this perspective of understanding the institutional order only as an ‘instituted 
order’ (not considering the counterpoint that is inherent to the concept, i.e. the role of instituting 
agents, in the concept of that author) is constituted as one of the sociological errors developed in the 
study of the matter and in relation to which is proposed, in his study, to counter position returning to 
“the concept of institution its dynamic significance” (Lourau, 1995, p. 136). According to him 
To empty the concept of institution of one of its primitive instances (instituting in the sense of 
founding, creating, breaking with an ancient order and creating a new one), sociology ended up 
identifying institution with the established order. It is not by accident if at the moment in which 
order appears to social instituting layers as uniquely repressive, the word institution appears to 
designate only that which is instituted. This theoretical error, which revolutionaries frequently 
commit, has the sociology of the last fifty years to blame for it (Lourau, 1995, p. 136). 
Likewise, Oliver (1991) highlights the fact that this emphasis on structuring character of the 
environment, seen as part of the theory of organizations it inherited from contemporary sociology, 
hampered the analysis of capacity for strategic action of social actors in the studies of some of the 
representatives of the institutional theory. In parallel, to this quasi-supersocialized conception, of 
agents and systems, several other writers have analyzed the influence of institutions without denying 
any degree of autonomy for them. There now arise the notions of organizational structure as 
simultaneously structuring of and structured by the actions of organizational actors (Ranson, Hinings, 
& Greenwood, 1980) and embeddedness of action in opposition to its determination and its absolute 
freedom (Granovetter, 1985), in addition to the notion of institution as containing within itself 
instituted forces as instituting as outlined above based on Lourau (1995). 
Granovetter (1985) is another author who criticizes strict opposition between the social and the 
individual. According to him, the conceptions of under and super socialized action is equal to his 
presupposition of atomization: the understanding that individual actions are determined by normative 
environment structures are the idea that the internalization of social values is given in such a profound 
way that individuals act as if these values were there own, i.e. without any awareness of their social 
origins (this also seems to be valued for the more radical versions of the new cogntivist 
institutionalism). The challenge, then, is to define the process by which institutions affect action 
without succumbing to one or another atomist version of action. Several authors in the field of 
organizational theory have proposed answers to this challenge, especially because it represents 
limitation of the organizational theory by suggesting that institutional and strategic approaches in 
organizations are mutually exclusive (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Machado-da-Silva, Fonseca, & 
Crubellate, 2005; Oliver, 1991, but also Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1994, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 
2001). 
Perhaps the best way to describe the dichotomy that has at times been identified in institutional 
theory, as mentioned above, is to say that it is based on a still latent conflict in institutional theory in 
organizations concerning the nature of actors and social systems and their relationship with their 
environments. This conflict is present in the notion of closed and rational systems, constituents of their 
environments versus the notion of open systems constituted by their environmental contexts. Several 
recent efforts to overcome this dichotomy in social theory and institutional theory in organizations, as 
seen above, have not diminished the importance of other and different alternatives to analyze this 
conflict. 
A second debate involved the supposed emphases that are predominant in institutional theory in 
organizations. To DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 15) one of the fundamental distinctions between the 
so-called old and new institutionalisms is that in the latter, it is understood that “not norms and values 
but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made”. 
Zucker echoes this statement (as cited in DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 15) saying that 
“institutionalization is fundamentally a cognitive process”. 
To Selznick (1996, p. 274) the supposed cognitivist emphasis as a brand of the new institutionalism 
is not as innovative as it seemed to be at first because it corresponds to the interpretativist notion that João Marcelo Crubellate 
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“[...] the interaction of culture and organization is mediated by socially constructed mind, that is, by 
patterns of perception and evaluation”. Perhaps owing to the declared Weberian basis (evident in the 
argument of Selznick), the author that most seems to have moved towards the integration of several 
notions of the phenomenon of institutions is Scott (1994, 1995, 2001), to whom these institutions 
involve systems of meaning that “[...] must incorporate representational, constitutive, and normative 
rules” (Scott, 1994, p. 60) or, “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995, p. xiii).  
But despite its integrative scope, the model of Scott (1995, 2001) continues to maintain institutional 
elements as conceptually segmented structures without sufficiently clear insight of their integration 
into the real plane, which seems to be indicative of space for attempts to explore this conflict in 
institutional theory that rests on the very definition of which this social phenomenon consists of or 
what exactly is its substance and concrete dynamic. 
The third conflict mentioned above concerns the social level of occurrence of the institutionalization 
process. To DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 15) “[...] institutions are macro level abstractions”. But as 
Scott (2001) points out, this emphasis on the macro-social level as a locus in the process is not 
exclusive to the most recent institutional theory. According to him, “while Meyer and Rowan 
developed the macro side of the [institutional] argument, Zucker [...] emphasized the micro 
foundations of institutions” (Scott, 2001, p. 43). 
To Zucker (1991) the predominance of institutional analyses at the macro-social level results from 
the focus on the content of institutions. She, in her turn, indicates that the analytical focus at the micro-
social level predominant in studies results from greater concern over the institutionalization process, 
which is in other ways misunderstood. Also important is her suggestion that institutional studies with a 
macro-analytical focus should adopt as a research goal not the process but rather the effects of 
institutionalization, not allowing it to be perceived that “[...] institutionalization is a continuous rather 
than a binary variable” (Zucker, 1991, p. 104). To Zucker institutionalization always occurs on the 
local plane or even the individual plane, denying the possibility of individual resistance to highly 
institutionalized (in the sense of the operational decoupling supposed by Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
This form of understanding institutions also excludes the possibility of different social planes in which 
the process of institutionalization may take place, by admitting only interpersonal relationships (micro 
plane) as a locus of institutionalization. 
However that may be, there is here a conflict in the institutional theory in organizations concerning 
the social plane that is most suitable for the analysis of institutionalization processes and one of its 
important consequences is the definition of the possible effects of this process, with a reflex on the 
coherence or not of the supposition that some individual autonomy space (and strategic action) of 
highly institutionalized patterns, a question raised above. 
We notice, however, that these oppositions are peculiar (or so they still remain) to the institutional 
studies in the theory of organizations. Outside of this scope, this dichotomy vision is already 
considered by some authors as in the process of being overcome. So it is that Lourau (1995), for 
instance, in his institutional analysis discusses some of the questions considered here of the 
perspective of a supposed opposition between privacy and universality. According to him: 
It is common to confuse particularity and singularity, artificially opposing the general (or universal) 
with the particular, forgetting that this opposition is purely abstract and that there is no practice but 
only in idealist ideology and philosophy. (…) With the opposition of the particular to the general, the 
dialectic gives way to ‘rational’, ‘natural’ or ‘fatal’ antonyms between the individual and society (or 
‘the world’), antonyms that are resolved or by preponderance conceded to society or by preeminence 
attributed to the individual (Lourau, 1995, p. 10). 
It seems evident that part of the institutional theory in organizations has still not overcome the stage 
of rational or natural oppositions between the categories of objectivity and subjectivity, organization 
and environment, individual and society, among others. Possibilities to advance in the sense of Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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solution of these other conflicts seem to be contained in the theory of social systems and it is this 
expectation that we intend to witness below. 
 
 
THREE CONCEPTS IN NEOFUNCTIONALIST THEORY 
 
 
In Niklas Luhmann (1983; 1989; 1995) neofunctionalism has its main expression, constituting 
radicalization of functionalism: “[...] Luhmann gathers conditions to invert the Parsonian structural-
functional viewpoint by changing the question from which functions are required by the system to 
how this is taken to respond to functional demands, i.e. functional operations” (Cohn, 1998, p. 58). 
The same author also states that 
From the moment in which it suits the system to respond to functional demands and these demands 
derive from relations with an environment marked by contingency (incapable, therefore, of guiding 
the more adequate constitution of the system), there is now a new task to be faced: that of crating on 
its own its own elements and carrying out self constituting operations [...] (Cohn, 1995, p. 58).  
Besides the notion of auotpoiesis, other neofunctionalist notions are found in this description, such 
as the ideas of complexity and differentiation and the very definition of social systems as 
simultaneously open and closed systems, which are discussed below as it is a fundamental notion for 
the purposes of this essay. 
 
Social Systems as Open and Closed Systems 
 
For the conventional systemic theory (Bertallanfy, 1975; Katz & Kahn, 1976) the systems must be 
analyzed as having as a base the supposed fundamental distinction of their opening (in the case of 
permeable systems) versus closed (in the case of isolated systems) in relation to the environmental 
context, not admitting in general the logical or conceptual validity of intermediate definitions. 
But for Luhmann (1989) the autopoietic nature of social systems demands understanding them as 
simultaneously open and closed systems. He also holds that they are sets of elements in interaction, 
including those interactions which, in their turn, constitute the basic mechanism from which systems 
conform to themselves in ongoing differentiation in relation to the environment, as they self 
reproduce. Luhmann follows the definition of Humberto Maturana and also understands systems as 
being autopoietically constituted, which means that the consist of “networks of productions of 
components that recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network that produces 
them” (Maturana as cited in Knodt, 1995, p. xx). In this definitions of systems the definition of 
autopoiesis is also implicit, i.e., the process by which living systems constitute themselves in a closed 
manner on themselves or, organizationally closed and that is in the basis of their own conservation. It 
may be dispensable, but it seems suitable to point out that, in this way, systems are more than the mere 
mechanical joining of their parts: in the conception of Luhmann, it is the process of autopoiesis that 
provides systems with their dynamicity and organicity.  
Luhmann (1989, 1995) applies this idea to social systems (economy, politics, religion, art, 
education, organizations and society itself). To him, a social system “[...] comes into being whenever 
an autopoietic connection of communications occurs and distinguishes itself against an environment 
by restricting the appropriate communications” (Luhmann, 1989, p. 145). A social system has, 
therefore, as a central point of its nature, the capacity to process meanings and their communication, 
through which they self reproduce. Social systems differ from one another through the specific 
codification of each system, which, in its turn, constitutes its organizational kernel through which “[...] 
a system can change structures without losing its code-determined identity” (Luhmann, 1989, p. 45). 
Therefore, “[...] a system acquires the possibility of operating as closed and open simultaneously” (p. 
45 – italics in the original), i.e., as a system that incorporates into its structure the pressures of the 
environmental context without being diluted into the environment, without altering its organization. João Marcelo Crubellate 
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Social systems, then, are autopoietic systems, which means that they are operationally closed. This 
does not imply, in turn, that they cannot be affected in any way by the environment. It does meant hat 
such systems are blind as to what happens beyond its boundaries, or in other words, they cannot 
receive information directly from or react directly to the environment. As an autonomous unit, any 
social system “[...] can react to its environment only in accordance with its own mode of operation, the 
mode of operation peculiar to it” (Bednarz Jr., 1989, p. xiii).  
This peculiar mode of operation is based, in the social systems, in the process of meaning. Thus, 
information found in the environment will not flow directly across boundaries of the system to which 
they will be something like an annoyance (Luhmann, 2002) which triggers the process of meaning 
which is, as anticipated earlier in this essay, through the definition of system, internal and always self 
referring: “Meaning always refers to meaning [...]. Systems bound to meaning can therefore never 
experience or act in a manner that is free from meaning” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 62). As a consequence, 
“in principle, everything is accessible to meaning systems, but only in the form of meaning” 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 63).  
In short, social systems are structurally adaptable or open because they are, at the same time and 
necessarily, operationally or organizationally closed. They communicate in some way with their 
environment only as they themselves, produce or select internally the meanings to which they will 
respond and which will be utilized to configure and reconfigure the frontiers between system and 
environment (Luhmann, 1989, 1995; Paterson, 1997). This implies that the system itself self-produces 
and also produces its own environment, because it is the one to define its frontiers. 
Such matters also result in implications for the notion of contingency relationship between systems 
and environments, which will be discussed below. 
 
Systems and Environments: Double Contingency 
 
The second neofunctionalist concept that we intend to discuss here derives from the conclusions 
presented above. When it is concluded that social systems are open and closed, it becomes possible to 
review the traditional idea of contingency. Conventionally, we take the relationship of contingency as 
one directional, which means that we admit that only environments affect systems or, in other words, 
that only the systems deal with the risk inherent to choices and the possibility of disappointment with 
the several options offered by the environment. According to Luhmann (1976, p. 96), “it has become 
customary to explain organizations by some kind of ´contingency theory´ […]. This means that 
differences in the structure of organizations can be explained by differences in their environment”. 
Fundamental to this perspective is the methodological notion of environment as a set of independent 
variables and organizations as a set of dependent variables. Therefore, we see that 
[...] the contingency theory develops two different notions, (1) dependence and (2) uncertainty, side 
by side. On the one hand contingency means that the structures and practices […] of a system 
depend on the way in which the environment becomes relevant to the system, while the reverse 
situation – the system working on the environment – is not generally taken into consideration […] 
(Luhmann, 1976, p. 97). 
Thus, contingency is understood as the opposite of necessary. To be contingent implies that there 
were other possibilities that were not confirmed or “something is contingent insofar as it is neither 
necessary nor impossible” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 106) and also implies analyzing the relationship 
between facts since the perspective of the system of environmental variables is recognized in the same 
way (as independent and therefore as facts). 
But as observed above, the relationship between environments and systems is not direct, nor is it 
based on the flow of information from the environment to the social system. Information is not a 
suitable concept for the environment, since it is the product of systemic interpretation (Luhmann, 
2002). Information, therefore, is always meaningful. The data found in the environment, in order to 
affect the system in some way, will have to be converted into information since within the context of Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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the system what flows is meanings, so that the environment, from the perspective of the system, is 
constituted as that which is selectively perceived and interpreted by the system (Luhmann, 1995; also 
Weick, 1969), through a process that is necessarily closed. Likewise, the very notion of environment 
can only be established form the system as a reference point, so that it becomes coherent to affirm that 
the environment is (conceptually) a product of the system. 
To understand better this possibility, we must resort to the sense attributed to the term meaning, 
which is the difference between what is real and its several possibilities (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). The 
meaning of the real depends on its other possibilities, in the perspective of who is defining it. The 
consequence is that it is real in the environment (as much as in the system) and always provisionally 
defined, depending on with which of its other possibilities it is being related to. Therefore, the 
environment is also contingent, also dependent on the system and also subjacent to the risk and 
possibility of frustration in relation to the system.. 
Luhmann (1976, p. 105) sums up this circular notion with the term double contingency and 
proposes a revision of the notion of contingency, suggesting it as a relationship “[...] not between 
facts, but between contingencies. They may vary on both sides [...]”. for instance, rules in 
organizations are “[...] designed to govern members´ behavior. But the rules are contingent too. They 
only acquire meaning and positive value through decisions, which implies that they can be altered and 
may even allow for their alteration [...]” (Luhmann, 1976, p. 99). In these terms, the rule will only be 
effective when it has meaning and, therefore, acquires some sense for social actors. The implications 
of this for the institutional theory (and the organizational theory in general) are anticipated partially by 
Luhmann:  
[...] organizational systems themselves react to the difference between them and their environments 
and base their structural choices on the fact that environmental structures and system structures 
sometimes vary or can be varied, both dependently and independently of one another. This seems to 
be the special focus on which organizational systems are differentiated, and the peculiar rationality 
of their self-organization and management is that they embrace the doubly contingent system-
environment relationships and carry it further (Luhmann, 1976, p. 108). 
 
Expectation of Expectation or Institutions as an Economy of Consensus 
 
The third concept to be presented here is related to the notion of double contingency. We must note 
that if the relationship between system and environment can be contingent in both directions, it 
becomes better described not as a relationship that originates in any possibility of determination of 
responses or of behaviors unless only as a relationship based on expectations or as a relationship that 
always carries a high risk of frustration, does not occur owing to certainties but only of trust. Luhmann 
states that 
One of the most important consequences of double contingency is the emergence of trust or distrust. 
When entering into situations with double contingency is experienced as particularly risky, they 
appear. The other can act otherwise than I expected precisely if and because he knows what I expect 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 127, italics in original text). 
Because of this evident risk (at its limit, paralyzing) the idea that the relationship between system 
and environment is doubly contingent also becomes coherent to identifying processes by which some 
degree of trust as to expectations being correct (in both they part of they system and the part of the 
environment) should emerge and be established. The relationship between system and environment, as 
a doubly contingent relationship and thus of high risk, implies a relationship between expectations. In 
short, it is a relationship based on expectations of expectations and not only on expectations of 
behavior. Therefore, 
Under the conditions of double contingency […] all experimenting and social acting is doubly 
relevant: one at the level of immediate expectations of behavior, satisfaction or the disappointment João Marcelo Crubellate 
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of that which is expected of another; the other in terms of evaluation of the meaning of behavior 
itself in relation to the expectation of the other (Luhmann, 1983, p. 48).  
For the possibility of a system becoming engaged in social interactions to occur, it is therefore 
necessary to “[...] have an expectation on the expectation that we have of it” (Luhmann, 1983, p. 48). 
The very existence of expectations already has a structural value by allowing some security of action 
(Luhmann, 1995). The reduction of uncertainties, however, originates from the stabilization or 
generalization of expectations (Luhmann, 1995), which has, in its turn, a double function:  
On the one hand, it executes a selection out of the totality of possibilities indicated [...]. And on the 
other, it bridges discontinuities in fact, temporal, and social regards, so that an expectation can still 
be used when the situation changes (Luhmann, 1995, p. 97).  
In synthesis, the stabilization and generalization of expectations facilitates the selection of 
alternatives in relation to a complex reality and also brings together discontinuities where the existence 
of a relationship is not necessarily evident (or where, in fact, it does not indeed exist). 
Also according to Luhmann (1983, p. 52), the norm and the Right itself should be understood under 
this lens, not having any single or main function to make behaviors predictable but rather to make 
reciprocal expectations compatible […] to regulate the expectation on expectations […] creating […] 
security in terms of expectations”. But the norm and the Right can undergo adaptation through mutual 
understandings concerning behaviors that alter them, modify them or transgress them, therefore 
depending on their own value. Another social element is included by Luhmann (1989) to analyze this 
stabilization: the third party (besides those who expect and those who obey or violate a rule, those that 
have no direct relation with specific social interaction but have expectations concerning it, for 
instance, the obeying or disobedience of the norm). it is the function of third parties, according to 
Luhmann (1983, p. 79), to give sustenance to institutions but this occurs indirectly because it is their 
“supposed opinion that sustains the institution”, in a way that whoever acts, acts based on expectations 
that concern the supposed expectations of third parties, and not in direct response to any imposed 
obligation, not even only with a base in the supposed expectations of those who interact directly with 
them. 
Institutionalization in this sense is not defined as generalization of consensus but rather as 
generalization of expectations on the expectation of consensus (or of consensus presumed by third 
parties). 
The function of institutions resides less in the creation and more in the economy of consensus, which 
is reached as they consensus is anticipated in the expectation on expectations, i.e. as a 
presupposition, no longer needing, in general, to be concretely expressed (Luhmann, 1983, p. 80). 
We thus see a certain double nature of institutions: while referring to third parties, any institution is 
sustained by normative mechanisms. On the other hand, whether or not to follow these supposed 
expectations in third parties is still a question of possibility, never a determination. Its existence “[…] 
does not oblige obedience […] But it motivates not wanting to face the consequences, not expressing 
disagreement, structuring thus the chances of communication in the sense of the institution” 
(Luhmann, 1983, p. 83). In this way, it is evident that there is also a cognitive sustenance mechanism 
of institutions, which could not be different owing to the operationally closed nature of the social 
systems and which implies the cognitive structure of meanings (in this case, expectations presumed in 
third parties are, in short, normative structures processed through meanings and the expectations 
which are presumed on these expectations are, in their turn, originating from cognitive processes). We 
may conclude that 
This mechanism of institutionalization does not stabilize on its own, […] but initially stabilized only 
hypotheses of continuity […]. In this acceptance, the concept of institution possesses its specific 
characteristic not in social compulsion, not in the broadening of the concrete consensus and not in 
the normativity of expectations […] its function lies in a tangible distribution of positions and 
behavioral risks, which make likely the maintenance of an experienced social reduction and Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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predictably better chances of certain normative projections. Those whose expectations are contrary 
to those of the institution will have the weight of presumed self-evidence against them (Luhmann, 
1983, p. 81). 
Therefore, it seems plausible to admit that this mechanism is simultaneously coercive, normative and 
(mainly) cognitive. The concept of expectation, as well as the two other concepts summarized above, 
clarifies aspects of the institutional theory and may represent an analytical alternative as we hope to 
discuss more extensively in the following section of the essay. 
 
 
NEOFUNCTIONALIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
Neofunctionalism contains different theories as to how to prepare a general theory of social systems. 
In this sense, it follows the guidance of Münch (1999, p. 201) concerning as “[...] comprehensive 
paradigm with a set of references in which the postulates of all approaches [analyzed by the author] 
are preserved” and “capable of including the different institutional fields to which the specific 
approaches propose to provide suitable explanations”. As for the three conflicts in the institutional 
theory in organizations, with which this essay begun, it appears possible to observe that 
neofunctionalism suggests alternatives of synthesis between the options of dichotomy. 
The notions of systemic openness or closeness, of double contingency and expectations of 
institutionalized expectations cast a light on the nature of institutions, the institutionalization process 
and, consequently, organizational processes and structures as processes and structures in 
institutionalization. As for the first of the conflicts (the relationship between social systems and the 
institutional environment) it seems possible to admit that, in the neofunctionalist perspective, the 
system demands institutionalized environmental patterns as a resource to give an initial push to action 
and those same patterns only acquire a degree of institutionalization as a result of the actions of the 
results of the implicated systems. 
The difference between Luhmann (1989, 1995) and Granovetter (1985) seems to lie in the degree in 
which the relationship with the environment is voluntary (in Granovetter) versus a vision of 
involuntary autonomy (in Luhmann), in which this relationship occurs as a communication process 
whenever there are environmental events that ‘fire off’ the self referring interpretation inherent to the 
system. The most important difference perhaps is that in keeping with the notion of embeddedness, the 
meanings are relatively free in that they are freely constructed as the agents interact socially. 
Meanwhile, in Luhmann, meaning possess a nucleus that belongs to each type of social system, which 
is synthesized in his theory by the idea of codification. A social system possesses an exclusive binary 
code around which meaning and interpretation occur of events that lie outside the construction of its 
environment (see especially Luhmann, 1989). Therefore, in the neofunctionalist theory the process of 
meaning is not as free as in the sociology of Granovetter, although it is conceived as fully 
autonomous. 
For part of the institutional theory, this notion challenges both the rationalist perspective because it 
becomes unviable to think of agents voluntarily constructing institutional patterns, with their reference 
being their interest and as a limit only self interested other agents, and the perspective of institutions as 
a direct source of motives of action of social agents, be it through normative determinations or 
cultural-cognitive conditioning. These perspectives focused exclusively on action or social structures 
are, from a neofunctionalist viewpoint, meaningless (Cohn, 1998): institutions are autonomous 
products, but not totally voluntary – of social actors (people and systems) implied therein, directly or 
indirectly, and at the same time they are the resource through which actors are reproduced as psychic 
systems (people) or social systems. In short, an environmental pattern cannot be analyzed without 
analyzing the actions that constitute, sustain or alter it as if it were a final, frozen state and 
independent. Likewise, there is not sense in analyzing actions in an isolated fashion, as if they did not 
demand stimulus or upsetting and the stabilization provided by environmental patterns. João Marcelo Crubellate 
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For the institutional theory in organizations, one of the main implications of this is that it must 
definitively abandon the opposition between institutional and strategic analysis of organizations, 
substituting it with the presupposed idea that in order to understand the actions of organizations, 
institutions and strategies must be analyzed in their interaction. Institutions only acquire the supposed 
stability that characterizes them through the ongoing strategic reaction of the actors and social systems 
affected by them, which takes them as a base of action and strengthens or questions them through the 
very answers that they stimulated. Likewise, those strategic actions or reactions would not occur 
without the horizon and the impulse provided by patterns in institutionalization. Institutions and 
strategies are co-dependent, in a single process, ongoing, always unfinished. According to Münch 
(1999, p. 204) this relationship refers to the fact that “[…] all concrete action involves a complex 
fabric of micro-interaction and macro relations, of the sort that both perspectives must compete for 
analysis”. Thus, the joint approach of the two phenomena is not only a theoretical option but indeed a 
promising alternative for organizational analysis. 
The neofunctionalist notions analyzed in this article, especially the idea of double contingency, 
appear to suggest a more productive analytical focus which falls back on the institutionalization 
process and not the localization of specific concrete institutions and their impact on actors and social 
systems because, from the viewpoint of those notions, the supposition that institutions are definitively 
crystallized is highly unlikely. It would be more productive to take the institutional process in the 
sense of an ever-growing process in continuous formation and deconstruction, i.e. that always as a 
concrete side and exterior (on the macro social plane) whose permanence is provisional, be they 
regulative or normative elements or institutionalized patterns of cognition, exactly because it depends 
on the relationships carved out in daily life (on the micro-social plane) between actors affected by 
them and the answers offered by those actors, both in terms of conformity and resistance (Oliver, 
1991; Scott, 2001), depending on the meanings attributed to them. 
The constructivist notion subjacent to the concept of double contingency suggests that in a 
neofunctionalist perspective, it would be suitable to characterize the institutional process as referring 
to the ever ongoing and provisional structuration of institutional patterns and the always autonomous 
actions of the systems and actions affected by them and constituted as based on patterns in 
structuration, but always referring to themselves and therefore operationally closed in terms of internal 
meanings to the systems themselves. 
This model reminds one of a continuous spiral of the frontiers between system and environment and 
which is developed as they system is self constructed through conformity or differentiation (in 
organizations through their strategic responses) in relation to environmental aspects to which the 
system itself provides a meaning. In this sense
(2),
 an institution is never the […] outcome or end state 
of an institutionalization process” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 204) but always a temporary state and, 
in conceptual terms, an artifice used to measure process which is indeed continuous. Thus, this 
empirical analysis would require going beyond the formal or explicit aspects of institutional elements 
also to analyze necessarily the aspects of daily life of the strategic reactions that suggest in answer to 
those elements and which, at the same time, (re)constitutes them. 
These systemic notions also cast a doubt on the regulating or controlling role of institutions, 
suggesting that even high degrees of institutionalization would not mean automatic responses, be it on 
the normative or cognitive plane and, mainly, if the reference is to social regulative patterns, imposed 
coercively. As seen above, the function of institutions does not lie in the control of behavior but rather 
in the increase in trust, which occurs when expectations are stabilized as to the supposed expectations 
of third parties. This stabilization offers a clearer horizon and makes it more likely (not more than this) 
that there will be certain types of responses. 
We must not expect a social rule to be born with the stability that characterizes institutional patterns. 
These patterns, as pointed out by Scott (1994, 1995, 2001), are institutional elements, but do not in 
themselves constitute institutions. In a neofunctionalist sense, the institutional process should be 
understood as including two aspects. The first would correspond to which social elements are being 
institutionalized. For instance, which aspects of a new law or government policy, or even an Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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organizational plane are receiving what type of responses from agents and systems they are aimed at 
and which they should supposedly regulate. The second would correspond to the social plane in which 
it acquires stability: as seen above, the idea of institutionalization here implies both expectations on 
the macro-social plane and expectations of expectations on the micro-social plane. A law ay exist and 
never affect in any way the behavior of some systems and social agents, or may affect them differently 
from what could initially have been contained in the text of the law as an expectation and thanks to the 
institutionalization process itself, the same happening with values, beliefs or socially generalized 
typifications. 
From this perspective, the critique of Tolbert and Zucker (1998) of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
concerning the possibility of unconnected actions in relation to highly institutionalized patterns only 
makes sense when we think of institutions as social facts that may reach such a high grade of 
stabilization to the point that they become objectified, determining behaviors and meanings. If 
institutions are though of as an ongoing process, as possibility or as stabilization of the hypothesis of 
their continuity through generalized expectations (Luhmann, 1983), then that degree of determination 
as being of the institutional phenomenon must not be admitted. In the neofunctionalist theory, 
institutions cease to be understood as containing consensus de facto. They only imply the expectation 
of consensus and thus their stabilization and continuity are always provisional and their impact on 
actions is never of an exclusive nature because even when coercive imposition occurs, its 
interpretation of the cognitive environment and its stabilization on the normative plane also has to 
occur. As such, they may suffer resistance (explicit or veiled) at any moment as long as there are 
social actors willing to assume the presumed risks of this behavior and own up to the responsibility of 
destabilization of the parameters supposed tacitly or accepted expressly (Luhmann, 1983). 
Thus, a loose coupling is always expected in relation to any institutionalization parameter since the 
action is the product of its interpretation by the system. For this same reason, a point-to-point 
correlation is what is least expected in relation to any type of institutional pattern (according to 
Luhmann, 1989; Meyer & Rowan, 1977 and also Weick, 1969), and its complete rejection is even less 
expected. Its complete rejection is highly unlikely and becomes more difficult the more the 
institutional pattern is socially stabilized. The degree of correlation, in short, will depend mainly on 
the internal logic of the implicated systems themselves (Machado-da-Silva & Fonseca, 1999; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1996), because of perceptive and interpretative interests and patterns (Scott, 
2001) which lead them to harness to those institutional patterns meanings which may lead or not to 
their pretensions of technical efficiency, leadership or simply obtaining social legitimacy, among 
others.  
We may conclude that in this perspective, the correlation between organizational structures and 
actions and institutional forces is circular: the structures and actions are guided by environmental 
forces. On the other hand, these environmental forces enter the institutionalization process when there 
is a certain degree of correlation, i.e. when they are responded to positively. 
When an institution is understood not as a final state but rather as a provisional stabilization of 
expectations of consensus, it becomes easier to understand why they do not determine action. If the 
actions of the systems are based on expectations (micro-social plane) of expectations presumed in 
third parties (macro-social plane), then as these expectations of third parties are institutionalized at a 
high degree, the greater the possibility there will be of expectations being developed that are coherent 
with them. Thus it is that institutions affect action, without determining it. This mechanism helps us to 
understand how reproduction of social patterns and actions can be thought of without having to 
succumb to the idea of environmental determination of actions as here we are dealing more with 
increased normative and cognitive safety than the expectations presumed in the direct reproduction of 
social patterns or externally dictated behaviors. Furthermore, the consequence of institutions is more 
to provide that type of stability of expectations than to dictate homogenous patterns which are much 
more fiction than fact (Luhmann, 1983). João Marcelo Crubellate 
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This ecology of institutions could then be resumed in the logic by which social patterns of a 
regulative, normative and cognitive nature are considered as supported by the general opinion, by third 
parties and, therefore, acquire social force by being presumed consensual. 
The institutional notion proposed here includes the fact that any of the institutional elements 
(according to Scott, 1995) acquires some degree of relevance and capacity to affect social systems 
exactly because – and as – they are perceived and interpreted by those systems. Through perception 
and interpretation of the institutional elements, they come to have some meaning from the viewpoint 
of the systems, becoming more or less relevant especially because of the meaning attributed to them 
and the actions and reactions that the systems elaborate as responses to them, these meanings being 
constructed based on the expectation of consensus presumed by third parties. Therefore, institutions 
are social phenomena that are temporarily stable and always subject to the process of social 
construction. 
 
 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
What we are attempting to propose here is not a breaking with explanations given for the 
institutionalization of organizational characteristics. By examining neofunctionalist and institutionalist 
explanations, it does not mean a wish to formalize a new institutional theory but rather to show the 
possibilities for understanding phenomena that are still under analysis in the context of the theory of 
organizations, mainly the explanation of the institutionalization process as a process that involves 
simultaneous levels of occurrence. These aspects are already found in the institutional analysis done 
by authors and researchers in other theoretical fields and by some authors within the field of 
organizations, but it seems that this is not yet the predominant line in organizational studies, which has 
implied obsolescence of the field in some of the analyses or, in other cases, become superfluous 
because of the criticisms leveled against it. 
Also, by focusing simultaneously on the cognitive and normative nature of institutional patterns, 
neofunctionalist theory seems to indicate ways to overcome the dichotomy marked by objectivist 
positions of the understanding of organizational reality (when these organizations, and also 
institutions, are understood as concrete facts and absolutely external to individual consciences) versus 
positions that are supported exclusively in the subjective nature of the organizational and institutional 
phenomenon and deny them any supra-individual element. It is understood here that in the 
neofunctionalist conception, the institutional phenomenon includes a normative dimension and, 
therefore, at least inter-subjective, because the expectations and values always emerge from interaction 
of social agents, and also a cognitive dimension because these same expectations and values are 
primarily perceived and interpreted so that answers can be generated. 
On the other hand, the desire here is not to suggest that the neofunctionalist theory includes all the 
analytical possibilities implied in the institutional perspective. It is constituted as another possible 
form of study of the institutionalization process, with implications, possibilities and specific 
limitations, but certainly not the only possible perspective. The complex and multi-paradigmatic 
nature of the neofunctionalist approach, however, casts lights on the recursive logic of the 
institutionalization process, which seems to be in tune with tendencies of social theory and theoretical 
and paradigmatic advances already seen in other areas of human and social knowledge for a long time 
and in relation to which the theory of organizations seems to be lacking in being up to date. 
In short, what is expected is that this analytical line, i.e. the approach of the institutionalization 
process through the Luhmannian theory of neofunctionalism, should contribute to the already present 
effort to re-explain the organizational and social phenomena, adding new explicative horizons to the 
perspectives that are already traditional and, as is inevitable, new limitations. Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
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NOTES 
 
 
1 This paper received the ANPAD AWARD as the best paper presented at XXIX ANPAD Conference (Brasília, Brazil) 
in 2005. 
2 The term institutionalizing is suggested to Express the processual sense implied in this description similar to that of 
Machado-da-Silva, Fonseca and Crubellate (2005) and following the notion of organizing, proposed by Weick (1969). 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Barley, S., & Tolbert, P. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: studying the links between 
action and institution. Organization Studies, 18(1), 93-117. 
Bednarz, J., Jr. (1989). Translator´s introduction. In N. Luhmann (Coord.). Ecological communication 
(pp vii-xvi). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bertalanffy, L. (1975). Teoria geral dos sistemas (2a ed.). Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Boudon, R. (1998). Limitations of rational choice theory. American Journal of Sociology, 104(3), 817-
828. 
Cohn, G. (1998). As diferenças finas: de Simmel a Luhmann. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 
13(38), 53-62. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1991). Introduction. In W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.). The new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 1-38). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510.  
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. (1976). Psicologia social das organizações. São Paulo: Atlas. 
Lourau, R. (1995). A análise institucional. Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Luhmann, N. (1983). Sociologia do direito I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro. 
Luhmann, N. (1976). A general theory of organized social systems. In G. Hofstede & S. Kassem 
(Eds.). European contributions to organization theory (pp. 96-113). Amsterdam: Van Gorcum. 
Luhmann, N. (1989). Ecological communication. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Luhmann, N. (2002). Theories of distinction. Stanford: Stanford University Press. João Marcelo Crubellate 
BAR, v. 4, n. 1, art. 5, p. 66-81, Jan./April 2007    www.anpad.org.br/bar 
80
Machado-da-Silva, C. L., & Fonseca, V. (1999). Competitividade organizacional: conciliando padrões 
concorrenciais e padrões institucionais. In M. Vieira & L. Oliveira (Eds.). Administração 
contemporânea: perspectivas estratégicas (pp. 27-39). São Paulo: Atlas. 
Machado-da-Silva, C. L., Fonseca, V., & Crubellate, J. (2005). Estrutura, agência e interpretação: 
elementos para uma abordagem recursiva do processo de institucionalização. Revista de 
Administração Contemporânea, 9(1ª Edição Especial), 9-40. 
Maturana, H. (2002). Prefácio de Humberto Maturana Romesin à 2ª edição. In H. Maturana & F. 
Varela (Coords.). De máquinas e seres vivos (2a ed.). Porto Alegre: Artmed. 
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363. 
Münch, R. (1999). A teoria parsoniana hoje: a busca de uma nova síntese. In A. Giddens & J. Turner 
(Eds.). Teoria social hoje (pp. 175-228). São Paulo: Editora UNESP. 
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 
16(1), 145-179. 
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. New York: Free Press. 
Paterson, J. (1997). An introduction to Luhmann. Theory, Culture & Society, 14(1), 37-39. 
Ranson, S., Hinings, B., & Greenwood, R. (1980). The structuring of organizational structures. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 1-17. 
Scott, W. R. (1994). Institution and organizations: toward a theoretical synthesis. In W. R. Scott & J. 
Meyer (Eds.). Institutional environments and organizations: structural complexity and 
individualism (pp. 55-80). Thousand Oaks: SAGE.  
Scott, W. R. (1995). Introduction: institutional theory and organizations. In W. R. Scott & S. 
Christensen (Eds.). The institutional construction of organizations (pp. xi-xxiii). Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications. 
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Scott, W. R., & Meyer, J. (1994). Institutional analysis: variance and process theory approaches. In W. 
R. Scott & J. Meyer (Eds.). Institutional environments and organizations: structural complexity 
and individualism (pp. 81-112). Thousand Oaks: SAGE.  
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration. New York: Row, Peterson and Co. 
Selznick, P. (1966). TVA and the grass roots. New York, Harper & Row. 
Selznick, P. (1996, June). Institutionalism “old” and “new”. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, pp. 
270-277. 
Simon, H. (1970). Comportamento administrativo (2a ed.). Rio de Janeiro: FGV. 
Tolbert, P., & Zucker, L. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of 
organizations: the diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
28(1), 22-39. 
Tolbert, P., & Zucker, L. (1996). The institutionalization of institutional theory. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, 
& W. Nord (Eds.). Handbook of Organization Studies (pp.175-190). London: SAGE. 
Weick, K. (1969). The psychology of organizing. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co. 
Westphal, J., & Zajac, E. (2001). Decoupling policy from practice: the case of stock repurchase 
programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(2), 202-228. Three Neofunctionalist Conceptual Contributions to the Institutional Theory in Organizations 
 
BAR, v. 4, n. 1, art. 5, p. 66-81, Jan./April 2007    www.anpad.org.br/bar 
81
Zucker, L. (1991). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. In W. Powell & P. DiMaggio 
(Eds.). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 83-107). Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
 
 
 
 